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COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW-ARGENTINE LAW-CRIMINAL LAW--Judg-
ment of Former Military Rulers for Human Rights Violations:
Jorge R. Videla et alial-In early December, 1985, an Argentine
federal court of appeals handed down five convictions in a crimi-
nal action against former ruling junta members. The charges
arose out of the military's proclaimed dirty war against subver-
sion when thousands of ordinary citizens suspected of "subver-
sion" suffered abduction, torture, and ultimately, summary exe-
cution.2 The civilian government which followed the military's
de facto era targeted the high command of the armed forces for
prosecution. Rather than standing trial for high treason or sub-
verting the Constitution, however, the nine officers charged were
called to answer for the common crimes of abduction, torture
and murder. The Videla court's resulting decision has been
hailed as a critical and unprecedented ruling in the history of
1. Dec. 9, 1985, CAmera Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Criminal y Correcional Fed-
eral de la Capital Federal [Federal Chamber of Appeals], Buenos Aires 198- L.L. _ .
An officially edited version of the court's 1,000 plus page opinion, still unreported, was
published in an Argentine periodical and is the source of all references to the opinion in
this article. El Diario del Juicio, Jan. 28, 1986 [hereinafter Juicio] 7-26. See also EL
LIBRO DE EL DIARIO DEL Juicio 459-542 (1986). For a comprehensive account of the alle-
gations against the military, see NUNCA MAS: INFORME DE LA COMISI6N NACIONAL DE
DESAPARICI6N DE PERSONAS, (1984) (hereinafter NUNCA MAS]. See also J. SIMPSON & J.
BENNET, THE DISAPPEARED AND THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA: THE STORY OF THE 11,000
ARGENTINIANS WHO VANISHED (1985).
2. The nine defendants in chronological order dating from the 1976 coup were: Army
General Jorge Videla, convicted; Navy Admiral Emilio Massera, convicted; Air Force
Brigadier General Orlando Agosti, convicted; Army General Roberto Eduardo Viola, con-
victed; Navy Admiral Armando Lambruschini, convicted; Air Force Brigadier General
Omar Graffigna, acquitted; Army General Leopoldo Galtieri, acquitted; Navy Admiral
Jorge Anaya, acquitted; Air Force Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo, acquitted. Ar-
gentine Court Finds Five Guilty for Junta Roles, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1985, at Al, col.
6. For a detailed account of the various charges proven and corresponding sentencing,
see E. Gray, Human Rights: Conviction of Former Argentine Military Commanders for
Human Rights Abuses Committed by Subordinates, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 688, 691-692,
691-692 nn. 20-22 (1986) [hereinafter Gray].
Three of the four acquitted on these charges, General Galtieri, Admiral Anaya, and
Brigadier General Lami Dozo, were convicted in a separate proceeding for criminal negli-




The court held that no justification existed for adopting ille-
gal means to defeat subversion, despite the court's recognition
that the acts of the defendants were in response to a wave of
terror which swept the country in the early 1970s leaving hun-
dreds dead at the hands of extremists of the left.' Of the five
defendants convicted, General Jorge Videla and Admiral Emilio
Massera were given life sentences and the remaining three re-
ceived sentences varying from four-and-one-half to seventeen
years.' The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's rulings
with only slight modifications in sentencing.6
The implicit legacy of this uncommon juridical event lies in
its value as a model for coming to terms with official terrorism.
The aftershocks of the trial continue to be felt in Argentina,7
particularly with respect to the ongoing prosecutions of junior
officers in decision-making capacities, and of military personnel
who exceeded lawful orders.8 Beyond Argentina's borders, de-
mands are being made in other Latin American countries that
Argentine-style trials be imposed on members of their own
armed forces,9 despite the countervailing risk of greater re-
3. Argentina: National Appeals Court (Criminal Division) Judgment on Human
Rights Violations by Former Military Leaders, 26 INT'L. LEGAL MAT. 12 (E. Dahl & A.
Garro eds. Mar. 1987) (citing to pagination of the prepublication manuscript) [hereinaf-
ter INT'L. LEGAL MAT.].
4. Juicio, supra note 1, at 25, col. 4 and at 26, cols. 1-4.
5. Id. at 9, col. 1.
6. INT'L LEGAL MAT., supra note 3, at 11. (The judgment was handed down on Decem-
ber 30, 1986.)
7. On the changing cultural and political climate in Argentina soon after the resump-
tion of constitutional rule and the trial of the juntas, see, e.g., Educators in Argentina
Add Democracy to the Curriculum, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1985 at 2E, col. 3; Argentina
Reports Arresting Ex-Nazi for Extradition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1985 at 3, col. 3.
8. For articles in the U.S. press on the continuing prosecutions, see The Dirty War's
Dirty Laundry: Should Argentina End its Human Rights Trials? Newsweek, Feb. 23,
1987 at 40; More Argentine Officers Face Trials, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1987 at 3, col. 1;
Justice Diluted in Argentina, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987 at 26, col. 1; Closing the Book,
The Nation, Feb. 28, 1987 at 239.
On the criminal responsibility of those who obeyed orders, see INT'L. LEGAL MAT,
supra note 3, at 5-6, and on the law of "Full Stop" cutting off the prosecutions as of
February 22, 1987 id. at 11-12. See also, Call for Amnesty in Argentina, N.Y. Times, May
17, 1987 at E2, col.1 (legislation proposed by President Alfonsin to virtually absolve all
middle and lower ranking military officers for their role in the "dirty war").
9. See An '82 Slaying Stirs Politics in Brazil, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985 at 3, col. 1;
Latin Military Put on Notice by Junta Trial, N.Y. Times Dec. 15, 1985 at 15 A, col. 1;
Democracy Isn't Curing All that Ails Uruguay, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1987 at 12A, col. 3.
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trenchment by current military dictators in the face of such
prospects.
At its most confounding, the conflict posed at trial was
whether war, here an internal "war on subversion," can or
should be governed by law.' ° If, contrary to the defendants' posi-
tion, conduct in such a war was found to be amenable to judg-
ment, then the triers of fact and law would need to examine if
and when the commission of crimes by subordinates may be im-
puted to their military commanders.
The prosecution demanded that the defendants be found
guilty for having given illegal orders which were ultimately car-
ried out by others." In the alternative, the prosecution main-
tained that the commanders were under a duty to stop the ille-
gal acts from occurring. The prosecution also argued that the
army, navy and air force commanders who presided over the
three successive juntas from 1976 to 1983 should be judged col-
lectively and serially by term in office. Criminal liability would
then lie without regard to which branch actually carried out the
alleged orders.
The litigation strategy of the defense was to plead general
denials of all wrongdoing and in tandem to reject out-of-hand
the premise that rules even exist by which the accused might be
judged.' 2 A number of the defendants, each represented by sepa-
rate counsel, argued against the prosecution's theory of liability
based on collective responsibility. They insisted that orders from
any one member of the junta was authoritative only as to that
member's branch of the armed forces. Another defense argu-
ment denying liability pertained to actual commission of specific
crimes. The defense maintained that only the individual who
physically carried out the act could be held responsible. They
argued that any crime which may have been committed (without
conceding that any were) was the result of excesses on the part
of subordinates.
10. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15-16.
11. La Acusaci6n del Fiscal Strassera, La Semana, Suplemento Especial xi-xii (Fall
1985) [hereinafter Strassera].
12. Defensa individual frente a la acusacibn por juntas, Juicio, Sept. 24, 1985 at col.
1-6.
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Background
A weak civilian government beset by rising anarchy and vio-
lence following the death of President Juan Per6n in 1974 pro-
vided the Argentine military with both the impetus and tacit
popular approval to overthrow Per6n's constitutional successor,
his vice-president and widow, Isabel Per6n.1 The extremists re-
sponsible for the general instability were made up largely of
members of both the far right and the far left wings of the
splintering Peronist Party. The military take-over came as no
great surprise to observers of the Argentine political scene, given
the almost constant interruptions in civilian rule during the past
half century. The military intervened in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962,
1966,14 and again in 1976 when the first junta's defendants, Gen-
eral Jorge Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and Brigadier Gen-
eral Orlando Agosti, seized control of the country.15
The method by which the junta chose to deal with the ex-
tremism of the left (the rightist fringe elements having joined
forces with the government)'6 was to erect and maintain an elab-
orate network of secret security forces, torture centers and con-
13. WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: THE AMERICAS WATCH REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 96 (C. Brown, ed. 1985). For a capsule history of events
leading up to the 1976 military takeover, see R. Dworkin, Report from Hell, The N.Y.
Review of Books, Jul. 17, 1986, 11-16 (reviewing NUNCA MAs) [hereinafter Report from
Hell].
14. The military overthrew President Yrigoyen in 1930. In 1943, President Castillo
was overthrown by a military uprising that included Colonel Juan D. Per6n. Per6n sub-
sequently became President and was removed by coup in 1955. In 1962, the military
deposed elected President Frondizi. President Ilia was overthrown in 1966. See J. OCON,
HISTORIA ARGENTINA 553-66 (1974).
For an Argentine sociologist's perspective on the military's pervasive involvement in
politics over the course of Argentine history, see Corradi, Argentina, in LATIN AMERICA:
THE STRUGGLE WITH DEPENDENCY AND BEYOND 340-400 (R. Chilcote & J. Edelstein eds.
1974) [hereinafter Corradi].
[Tihe Argentine army had always been "political": compulsory military service,
established in 1901, was designed with political socialization in mind. The army
was charged with overseeing elections. In Argentina the draft card and the voter
registration card are the same documents for males over eighteen years of age. In
brief, the Argentine armed forces have always been oriented to "civic action"
programs.
Id. at 343.
15. In 1976, General Jorge Videla led the coup in the first of a series of three juntas.
16. See Strassera, supra note 11, at iv (The Alianza Anticomunista Argentina disap-
peared from the scene after the '76 coup, and impliedly, was integrated into the state's
apparatus of terror).
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centration camps.1" The official panel which investigated the dis-
appearances was able to identify 365 separate clandestine
concentration camps and torture centers operating in Argentina,
principally between 1976 and 1979. The process of "disappear-
ing" involved conspicuous similarities in the vast majority of
cases. Typically, victims were seized in the middle of the night
by unidentified, armed men. The victims were forcibly or by
threat of force, removed from their homes and bundled into the
trunks of waiting automobiles. These vehicles were invariably
the ubiquitous Ford Falcons without license plates which came
to be identified with the abduction squads.
The targets were often young people, but anyone was a po-
tential abductee. Very few of the victims maintained card-carry-
ing alliegance or even particular sympathy for any radical group.
They, rather, bore some relationship, however tenuous, to what
their abductors considered to be subversive activities. These in-
cluded such ties as university affiliation, a, profession in the so-
cial sciences, union membership, participation in literacy pro-
grams, or all the more tangentially, the appearance of one's
name in the address book of someone seized for one of the rea-
sons just mentioned.
In the aftermath of an abduction, the home of the victim
was looted and property stolen. Most of those who became
known as los desaparecidos (the disappeared ones) lived what
remained of their lives in the detention centers, hooded or blind-
17. For detail on the juntas' antisubversive methodology from which the information
for this section was derived, see NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 810; Report from Hell,
supra note 13, at 12; Osiel, The Making of Human Rights Policy in Argentina: The
Impact of Ideas and Interests on a Legal Conflict, 18 J. LAT. AMER. STUD. 139-142 [here-
inafter Osiel].
According to Mark Osiel, who spent ten weeks in Argentina during the height of the
trial studying the issues and conducting interviews, the "national security" doctrine pro-
vided the military with a rationale for deciding whom to target for abduction. It was
generally believed by the operative factions of the military that "Christian civilization
had to be preserved against those who, under the banner of tolerance had tolerated the
questioning of authority, sacred and secular." The permissiveness of the universities was
thought to be the "natural breeding ground of terrorists." According to Osiel's explica-
tion of the mind set of the military, the terrorists had carried the cultural subversiveness
of the liberal universities to its logical conclusion. The military was able to justify killing
those who displayed sympathies for social change since their realization of full subver-
siveness was only a matter of time. "It would have been useless to kill only the insects




folded, and deprived of even the basic necessities of life. The
prisoners were isolated from one another and methodically tor-
tured with beatings, electric shocks and near-drownings. No less
severe treatment ensued for reasons of youth,18 gender, or reli-
gious vocation. Release of an abductee was occasionally effected
as in the celebrated case of Jacobo Timerman, largely as a result
of international pressure,19 but more often the captors, as a law
unto themselves, appeared to make life and death decisions out
of sheer caprice. Under the massive, but silent testamentary
weight of the thousands who failed to reappear, it has been since
presumed that all of these suffered the fate of summary execu-
tion.20 Incineration, mass burial in unmarked graves, and ejec-
tion from aircraft into the sea were means by which the corpses
of persons never officially detained, charged or tried, were ren-
dered unidentifiable. When the junta seized power, it dismissed
the provincial governors and dissolved the Congress. The new
rulers replaced the Supreme Court with their own appointees
despite the Argentine Constitution's guarantee of life tenure.2'
The new panel of justices was composed of military supporters
and retired officers, but even they were subject to dismissal at
will.22 The junta issued a series of decrees aimed at legitimizing
its war against subversion, 23 and it continued to validate the
state of siege imposed by the government of Isabel Per6n.24
18. A shocking total of 130 cases of infant disappearances were reported. NUNCA MAS,
supra note 1 at 299, 322. The Official Story, a film by Maria Louisa Bemberg about the
horror of children who vanished during the military rule from 1976 to 1983 won an acad-
emy award in 1986 for best foreign film. Freedom Nourishes Argentine Movies, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 29, 1987 at Sec. 2-1, col. 1.
19. See J. TIMERMAN, PRESO SIN NOMBRE, CELDA SIN NOMERO (1982).
20. Even the head of the transitional military government, General Bignone, declared
the "missing" presumed dead prior to the elections of 1983. Human Rights in the World:
Argentina, 31 INTL COMM'N JURISTS REV. 2, n. 2 (1983) [hereinafter INTL COMM'N
JURISTS].
21. CONSTITUCION NACIONAL, art. 96 (Argent.) For an English translation, see 1
ABLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, CONSTITUTION
OF ARGENTINA 1853 (as amended) at 20 (1986)[hereinafter CONSTI. ARGENT.].
22. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human
Rights Violations in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118 (1984) [hereinafter Dictatorship
on Trial].
23. Boletin Oficial of the Republic of Argentina, Military Junta, Process of National
Reorganization, Statute for the Process of National Reorganization (Nov. 21, 1978), re-
printed in A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, supra note 21, at 26-30.
24. For the wording of Article 23 of the Argentine Constitution granting authority to
declare a state of siege, see note 98 infra.
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When it became clear that the military's power was in
eclipse after the disastrous Falklands/Malvinas War, and the
economy in more than just disarray, the junta felt obliged to call
for elections.2 Although the junta attempted to barter its agree-
ment to return control to a civilian government for blanket im-
munity for the armed forces, such an agreement was flatly re-
jected by Rail Alfonsin, candidate of the Uni6n Civica Radical
Party, who later carried the popular vote to the presidency.
26
Nevertheless, as the junta's rule drew to a close, the com-
manders-in-chief issued a decree absolving military personnel of
all offenses committed in the war against subversion.27
Within days of taking office, President Alfonsin issued a de-
cree calling for the criminal prosecution of the nine former junta
members who had ruled the country from 1976 to 1983.28 He
asked Congress to repeal the newly minted amnesty law29 and to
amend the Code of Military Justice."0 The amendments called
for military jurisdiction at the trial level for all cases brought
against military personnel who held decision-making positions,
as well as against subordinates who committed atrocities. Deci-
sions of the military tribunal were then subject to federal review.
The President also ordered a special commission to investigate
the disappearances with instructions to report its findings within
180 days.3
The Argentine Legislature expeditiously enacted into law
25. Dictatorship on Trial, supra note 22, at 124. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985 at
E3, col. 1 (attributes the military's downfall to the failing economy and the 1982 Falk-
lands/Malvinas War rather than societal disaffection with the military over the so-called
dirty war).
26. Osiel, supra note 17, at 135, 143-144 (In contrast, the Peronist Party candidate,
widely expected to win, publicly announced that he would honor the amnesty.); INTL
COMM'N JURISTS REV. at 1 (1983) (Alfonsin won with 52% of the votes cast; the Peronist
candidate brought in 40%.).
27. Law of National Pacification, No. 22.924, Sept. 22, 1983, 1983-B A.L.J.A. 1681.
28. Decree No. 158, Dec. 13, 1983, 1983B A.L.J.A. 1943.
29. See C. Nino, Comment-The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitu-
tional Government: A Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 217, 223 (1985) (argued as to the inva-
lidity of the Amnesty Law under the Constitution).
30. Law No. 23.040, Dec. 27, 1983, 1983-B A.L.J.A. 1813.
31. Decree No. 157, Dec. 13, 1983, 1983-B A.L.J.A. 1944 (This decree also ordered the
capture and trial of suspected leaders of the Montoneros guerilla movement.) See Osiel,
supra note 17 at 138, 143-159 (examining the president's policy as an expression of his




the President's proposals.3 2 The amended Code of Military Jus-
tice specifically provided that the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces, the military's highest court, report on the status
of its proceedings against the junta members. This was to issue
within six months of the commencement of the action. Any un-
justified delay or negligence in the prosecution of the trial could
trigger a motion for removal to the federal court.
The statute also created a defense of mistake, or what
amounted to lack of mens rea for subordinates who acted with-
out decision-making capacity. Subordinates who carried out a
superior's orders were presumed to have believed that the orders
were lawful in the absence of evidence to the contrary."3 The
presumption explicitly did not operate in favor of subordinates
found to have committed atrocities. 4
These provisions to the Code of Military Justice were bit-
terly contested by both human rights groups in Argentina and
by the armed forces.35 The human rights groups contended that
routing the trials through the military tribunals would result in
a denial of due process and equal protection of the law. They
argued that when military procedural law is applied, as would be
the case in these proceedings, fewer safeguards are available to
either the victim or the accused than under federal law.3 ' Argen-
tine military courts, like their counterparts in the United States,
are created pursuant to the Legislative Powers of the Constitu-
tion. Military procedural law obeys the institutional imperatives
of the military, a hierarchical body dedicated to discipline and
32. Law No. 23.049, Feb. 14, 1984, 1984A A.L.J.A. 6.
33. Id. at art. 11. For legislative history, see Diario de Cdzmara de Senadores de la
Naci6n, Special Session, Jan. 31 - Feb. 1, 1984; Diario de Sesiones de la Cdmara de
Diputados de la Naci6n, Special Session, Feb. 9, 1984.
34. Law 23.049 at art. 11.
35. See Gray, supra note 2, at n. 10 and accompanying text at 689-690.
36. Dictatorship on Trial, supra note 22, at 129-130. The survivors argued lack of
access to the federal courts since under federal rules of criminal procedure, victims of
crimes, or their representatives are entitled to initiate querellas (criminal complaints)
involving serious felonies, or to join the public prosecutor as a party to the criminal
proceeding. COD. PROC. PEN arts. 170-176. But for an explication of Law 23.049 more
favorable to the victims, see INT'L. LEGAL MAT. supra note 3, at 5 (The new law added a
provision to Article 100 of the CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE whereby the victim of the
crime or his relatives may intervene in the military procedure to request the production
of any evidence and to appeal to the pertinent Federal Appeals Court.).
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immediate response to superior orders.3 This rationale is very
distinct from the policies of federalism and respect for individ-
ual liberties which underlie the federal system. Created under
the Judicial Powers of the Constitution, the federal courts are
endowed with far greater mechanisms for insuring independence
and impartiality. Federal judges, for example, are constitution-
ally endowed with life tenure,38 while judgeships in the courts of
the armed forces are filled by military officers on a rotating ba-
sis. 39 Under the Argentine civil law tradition, federal judges con-
duct trials by the inquisitorial method.40 This authorizes such
courts to confront one witness with another offering contradic-
tory testimony,41 unlike the military courts which prohibit such
confrontation if the party contradicting another witness is
subordinate in rank to the latter."2
The military, for its part, contested the applicability of the
amended Code of Military Justice to offenses committed before
the enactment of such provisions on ex post facto grounds. The
military also contended that the right of appeal to the federal
court violated the constitutional right of an accused to be judged
by his juez natural (natural judge), thus demanding that all
proceedings be conducted under military jurisdiction. 3
In Bignone, Reynaldo R., the Argentine Supreme Court ad-
dressed the survivors' petition holding in favor of the constitu-
tionality of the contested provisions.' 4 The Argentine Court
cited in support a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Fletcher
v. Peck.45 The Court followed the Fletcher principle of deference
to the presumed validity of a legislative enactment despite the
Court's reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality. The Court
held that the time limitations placed on military tribunals and
37, Similarly, U.S. military courts are not part of the Article III judiciary. M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 39 (1980).
38. CONST. ARGENT. art. 96, supra note 21, at 39.
39. Osiel, supra note 17, at 174. (The judges of the Supreme Council came from the
upper ranks of the officer corps.)
40. MERRYMAN & CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEMS 734 (1978).
41. COD. PROC. PEN. arts. 309-315 (CODIGOS A-Z 1983).
42. CoD. Jus. MIL. art. 288.
43. In Videla, Jorge R., Dec. 27, 1984, 1985-A L.L. 360, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the objections on both ex post facto and juez natural grounds.
44. Bignone, Reynaldo B., June 21, 1984, 1984-C L.L. 258.
45. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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the possibility of appellate review sufficed to save the amend-
ments from a facial attack.
Military Proceedings
The Supreme Council instituted proceedings against the
nine former commanders, but failed to complete its work by the
end of the prescribed six-month statutory period. 4" The Federal
Chamber of Appeals granted the Council a ninety-day extension
with a progress report due in thirty days.
On September 25, 1984, the Council issued a report declar-
ing its inability and unwillingness to complete proceedings
against the junta members.4 8 The Council declared unobjection-
able any of the orders or decrees issued during the antisubver-
sive campaign. The Council stated that criminal liability would
lie against the defendants, if at all, only for failure to properly
supervise subordinates to prevent possible excesses. But the
Council further maintained that it was dubious whether such ex-
cesses were provable. It stated that those who engaged in sub-
versive activities could not be considered to have been illegally
detained, thus suggesting that "subversive" ties, such as mem-
bership in a leftist political group, stripped the individual of the
right to formal arrest, notification of charges, or a fair trial. The
Council concluded that most of the alleged victims had engaged
in subversive activities."9
The Council found the credibility suspect of all those who
were themselves victims as well as the family members of vic-
tims. In the Council's view, the subversive status of the victims
was enough to taint the believability of their testimony and tes-
timony by relatives of victims was presumptively biased.50 The
repetition of patterns in testimony led the Council to discount
the veracity of the prosecution's witnesses on the assumption
that this consistency was the product of deliberate and calcu-
lated falsification. The Council concluded its report by empha-
sizing the importance in a military context of discipline, hierar-
46. Dictatorship on Trial, supra note 22, at 138.
47. Id. at 139.
48. Id. at 140 (citing La Prensa, Sept. 26, 1984 at 1, col. 1).
49. La Prensa, Id. at 1, col. 5.
50. Id. at 4, col. 3.
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chy, and obedience to superior orders.5 1
Federal Appellate Review
In accordance with the revised Code of Military Justice, the
case was removed to the Federal Appellate Chamber of Buenos
Aires before judges normally accustomed to hearing limited is-
sues on appeal in private proceedings. 5 2 The revised Code pro-
vided for an open trial and oral trial proceedings."3 This de-
parted radically from conventional practice in federal court.
Unlike the due process safeguards of the United States criminal
justice system, criminal proceedings under Argentine federal
rules of criminal procedure, even at the trial level, are neither
oral nor open to the public.5 At the time of removal from mili-
tary to federal forum, the embrionic state to which the action
had progressed made a mere review of findings impossible.
Neither could the federal court simply continue where the Coun-
cil had left off. As a result, the appellate court found itself in the
unprecedented position of conducting a full-fledged criminal
trial. 5
The finders of fact and law consisted of six appellate court
judges from a wide variety of backgrounds and political par-
ties. 6 The panel members spent from October 9, 1984 until the
opening of the trial on April 25, 1985 reviewing thousands of
pages of testimony compiled by the President's commission as
well as relevant case law and legislation. At trial, the judges
heard 496 hours of testimony broken down as follows: Thirty to
forty percent of the witnesses were surviving victims of abduc-
tion and torture; another thirty to forty percent were relatives
and neighbors of less fortunate victims who failed to reappear;
and the final twenty percent included foreign witnesses, military
51. Id.
52. Address by Judge Andr~s J. D'Alessio at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, (Mar. 3, 1986) [hereinafter D'Alessio] (Judge D'Alessio was one of the six




56. Besides Judge D'Alessio, Guillermo A. C. Ledesma, Ricardo R. Gil Lavedra,
Jorge A. Valerga Araoz, Jorge Edwin Torlasco, and Le6n Carlos Arslanian comprised the




personnel and experts. 7
Issues at Trial
The most crucial issues presented at trial revolved around
the responsibility of commanders-in-chief for ordering subordi-
nates to carry out abductions, torture, executions and other enu-
merated crimes.58 In the alternative, if the commanders could
not be found guilty as principals, the issue was whether they had
a duty to prevent the carnage. Finally, were the defendants re-
sponsible as individuals or collectively as members of a gov-
erning junta.
Dispositions at Trial
The court flatly rejected the prosecution's argument of col-
lective responsibility.50 It found that the several branches of the
armed forces were in fact very independent. The Falklands/
Malvinas War had provided a recent and graphic illustration of
the lack of coordination between the services. In further support
of their separateness, the court cited the historical and constitu-
tional function of the army as a land force versus the traditional
roles of the navy and air force. Statistics bore out this distinc-
tion confirming the Army's primary role in the antisubversive
campaign. The aggregate of offenses charged against the Army
was much higher than those brought against the other two
branches.
The court reviewed the legal basis for eight distinct charges
and examined the underlying proof for 709 representative cases
brought against the defendants. They included: (1) illegitimate
deprivation of liberty,60 (2) torture,6' (3) homicide, 2 (4) aggra-
vated homicide,63 (5) theft, 4 (6) coverup,65 (7) reduction to in-
57. See D'Alessio, supra note 52.
58. Juicio, supra note 1, at 17.
59. Id..
60. Juicio, supra note 1, at 7, col. 4 (citing CONST. ARGENT. art. 18).
61. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 1 (citing COD. PEN. art. 144 (Argen.)). For the most
current English translation, see THE ARGENTINE PENAL CODE, AMER. SERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES (E. Gonzalez Lopez trans. 1963).
62. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 1-2.
63. Id. at 8, col. 2.
64. Id. at 8, col. 2 (citing COD. PEN. art. 164).
65. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 2-3 (citing COD. PEN. art. 277 §6).
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voluntary servitude,6 6 and (8) ideological forgery (the making of
false statements in public documents). 7 The court found that
only the first five charges could be sustained on the law and the
facts and only against certain of the defendants.SThe court
found, as a matter of fact, that certain defendants issued orders
to seize prisoners and to maintain a secret system of detention
centers.6 9 This represented a clear violation of individual liber-
ties guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution.7 0 Favoring
the defendants on a different matter, the court discounted liabil-
ity for refusals to call a halt to illegal detentions imposed by a
predecessor. The court, however, squarely rejected the defense
argument that the detentions imposed during their tenure in
control had been legally obtained by decree of a previous consti-
tutional government granting the armed forces license to "anni-
hilate terrorism.'
1
On the homicide charges, the defense urged the court to re-
strict the prosecution based on the lack of existence of identifi-
able evidence. The defense interpreted the corpus delicti rule to
require that the dead bodies of the allegedly deceased actually
be found.7 ' The court disagreed, holding that in order to prove
homicide, the corpus delicti need not be the corpse itself, but
66. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 3 (citing COD. PEN. ART. 140).
67. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 4.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id. at 16, col. 3-4.
70. Article 18 of the ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION provides:
No inhabitant of the Nation may be punished without previous trial, based on
an earlier law than the date of the offense, nor tried by special commissions, nor
removed from the judges designated by law before the date of the offense. No
one can be compelled to testify against himself, nor be arrested, except by virtue
of a written order from a competent authority. The defense, by trial, of the per-
son and of rights is inviolable. The residence is inviolable, as are letters, corre-
spondence and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for
what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed. The penalty of death for
political offenses, all kinds of torture, and flogging, are forever abolished. The
prisons of the Nation shall be healthy and clean, for the security and not for the
punishment of the prisoners confined therein; and any measure that under pre-
text or precaution inflicts on them punishment beyond the demands of security,
shall render liable the judge who authorizes it.
CONST. ARGENT. art. 18, supra note 21, at 5-6.
71. Laws 21.264 and 21.460
72. But see, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 140-145 (1982) (In the ab-
sence of some unusual enactment, North American jurisdictions do not follow the inter-
pretation advanced by the defense either.).
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rather may be the series of elements by which a judge is induced
to believe in the commission of a crime.
73
The court held that the technical requirements of the
crimes of cover-up and reduction to servitude punishable under
the Argentine Penal Code were not satisfied.7 As to the charge
of ideological forgery, the prosecution sought criminal liability
for the practice of either supplying false information, or no in-
formation, in response to investigations conducted preliminary
to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. In almost every in-
stance, these investigations failed to uncover acknowledgment
by the military that specified individuals were being held.7 The
court found that facts were unavailable to prove specifically
which personnel were responsible for furnishing or failing to fur-
nish information given the anonymous manner in which the mil-
itary processed these requests."
Pertinent Law
The court predicated its analysis of the conduct of the de-
fendants on a central theme of Montesquieu, that all states have
the same purpose, to preserve themselves without endangering
their objectives.7 7 In pursuing this analysis, the court looked to
the Preamble to the Argentine Constitution7 8 as an indisputable
expression and affirmation of the nation's collective objectives.
In language identical to its North American counterpart, the Ar-
gentine Preamble provides for "a national union [to] establish
73. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 1 (citing COD. Jus. MIL., art. 219 and C. DIAZ, EL
CUERPO DEL DELITO EN LA LEGISLACI6N PROCESAL ARGENTINA 35 (1965). Cf. W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 18 (1986). The almost universal American rule is that the con-
cept of corpus delicti involves two component parts: first the occurrence of the specific
kind of injury or loss (as in homicide, a person deceased); secondly, somebody's criminal-
ity as the source of the loss. Proof of the loss in homicide need not entail production of
the body. Id.
74. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 3.
75. Id. at 8, col. 4. Cf. Report from Hell, supra note 13, at 11. The courts had no
power to question the military's flat denials and the lawyers who brought habeas corpus
actions began to disappear themselves. See, e.g., Perez de Smith, 297 Fallos 338 (1977);
300 Fallos 832, 1282 (1978) (judicial inquiry into the disappearances on a consolidated
action of some 400 petitions for habeas corpus).
76. Juicio, supra note 1, at 8, col. 4.
77. The court cited to MONTESQUIEU, EL ESPIRITU DE LAS LEYES 201 (N. Estevanez &
M. Huici trans. 1951). For an English translation, see MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS (T.
Nugent trans. 1899).
78. CONST. ARGENT., supra, note 21.
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justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common de-
fense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity.
79
When the first set of junta members, General Jorge Videla,
Admiral Emilio Massera, and Brigadier General Orlando Agosti,
seized power on March 24, 1976, they proclaimed their basic
purpose to be the restoration of essential values fundamental to
the state. The court keyed off this asserted goal by examining
what laws existed during the course of this so-called restoration
of essential values in order to judge the legality of the means
chosen.
The Code of Military Justice provides that in time of war,
military jurisdiction shall extend to civilians or persons outside
the services who are in the operational or war zone and commit
an act sanctioned by the Code or by a commanding officer.8 0 The
Code further states that wartime commanders can issue orders
they believe are necessary for the security and discipline of their
troops. 1 Under another provision of the Code, military com-
manders are licensed to assume control over an area when civil-
ian authorities are powerless to stop looting and violence.8 2 Or-
ders issued under military authority in such circumstances
oblige compliance by all those who find themselves in these
zones. Such decrees, however, cannot impose any penalties be-
yond those prescribed by the Code of Military Justice or the Pe-
nal Code.8 3 In the case of looting, for example, shoot-to-kill or-
ders may be issued, but the guilty party must be surprised in the
act, refuse to surrender immediately, or use arms against the au-
thorities.8' The procedure for adjudicating violations of orders is
verbal and summary, but commanders are cautioned not to de-
prive the accused of a reasonable defense.8
With respect to rights to property, the National Defense
Law, promulgated in 1966, restricted certain rights to property
79. CONST. ARGENT., supra, note 21.
80. Juicio, supra note 1, at 9, col. 2.
81. Id.
82. CoD. Jus. MIL. art. 133.
83. Id. at art. 135.
84. Id. at art. 137. For a ruling on the police use of deadly force under U.S. case law,
see Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See also MODEL PENAL CODE §3.07
85. COD. Jus. MIL. art. 138.
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for the survival of the nation.86 Under this statute, however, any
governmental procurement of private property was subject to
formal requisition, indemnification and judicial review. 87 On the
local level, the Civil Defense Law of Buenos Aires, enacted in
1981, empowered the presiding municipal official to declare a
state of emergency in part or in all of the city.8
Even though the defendants claimed to rely on the forego-
ing legal instruments to obtain the goal of preserving essential
state values after their de facto rise to power on March 24, 1976,
the court made clear that before and after this date constitu-
tional guarantees remained in effect.8 9 These included all of the
following: the right to petition the authorities; the right to enter,
remain in, cross, or leave the country; the right to publish ideas
without prior censorship; the right to associate oneself with use-
ful ends; the right to teach and learn;90 the right to equality
before the law;91 the right to the inviolability of property; 2 the
right not to be judged without trial under law enacted prior to
the date of the offense; the right to be tried before one's natural
judge; the right to due process; the right to freedom from arrest
without a written order from a competent authority; the right to
the inviolability of the home and correspondence; the right to
freedom from torture and execution for political crimes;9" the
right to freedom from the Presidential exercise of Judicial pow-
ers;94 and the right to all implied rights derived from a republi-
can form of government.9 The court found that the defendants
could- neither satisfy compliance with the statutory law they
cited as relevant to emergency conditions, nor could they, in the
first instance, satisfy compliance with the more fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In effect, the court found
that the defendants had engaged in wholesale abrogation of the
86. Juicio, supra note 1, at 9, col. 3 (citing Law 16.970 (B.O. Oct. 10, 1966), regulated
by Decree 739 (B.O. Feb. 14, 1967)).
87. Juicio, supra note 1, at 9, col. 4.
88. Id. (citing Law 22.413).
89. Juicio, supra note 1, at 9, col. 4.
90. CONST. ARGENT. art. 14, supra note 21, at 4-5.
91. CONST. ARGENT. art. 16, supra note 21, at 5.
92. CONST. ARGENT. art. 17, supra note 21, at 5.
93. CONST. ARGENT. art. 18, supra note 21, at 5-6.
94. CONST. ARGENT. art. 95, supra note 21, at 20.





After concluding that the means chosen by the defendants
were patently illegal both under the Constitution and statutory
law, the court examined the defendants' claim that their acts
were shielded from criminality under the defense of necessity."
The basis of the necessity defense is that the defendants
may, in some circumstances, choose the "lesser of two evils,"
even if that evil is a crime . 7 The defendants must show that.the
harm sought to be avoided must be greater than the harm that
is committed. In addition, there may be no third alternative that
would also avoid the harm, but would be non-criminal or a less
serious crime. And finally, the harm must be imminent, not
merely future.
The court began its analysis by stating that it was evident
that the criminal acts imputed to the defendants-illegal depri-
vation of liberty, torture, robbery and murder-were evils
caused by those with responsibility for the use of state force.
The court also stated that the evils were causally linked one to
another. The criminal evils committed by the defendants were
avowedly carried out in the interest of preventing acts of terror
from being committed by subversives. The defendants believed
that the evil of the imagined disintegration of the state would be
avoided if the terrorists could be prevented from taking power.
The court held the necessity defense inapplicable to the de-
fendants. It reasoned that, although it is true that the defense
can be prompted by the actions of a third party, the acts of one
who may successfully invoke the defense must have been of a
defensive rather than offensive nature. As to the requirement
that the evil employed be "the lesser," the defense failed be-
cause the defendants abducted and killed in order to prevent the
abductions and killings by the terrorists. This was not a "lesser"
evil but an equivalent one.
96. On the court's exposition of the necessity defense, see Juicio, supra note 1, at 10,
col. 1-3 (The information for this section can be found therein.).
97. COD. Jus. MIL. art. 510. See R. NUREZ, DERECHO PENAL ARGENTINA 310 (1964). Cf.
MODEL PENAL CODE §3.02 (The evil sought to be avoided must be greater than that
sought to be prevented. The actor's belief in the necessity of his conduct to avoid the
contemplated harm is sufficient unless the actor was reckless or negligent).
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Regarding the immediacy of harm requirement, the court
reasoned that, if, as the defense contended, criminal acts were
committed to prevent the insurgents from seizing political power
and installing a tyrannical regime, then such an evil lacked im-
minence, even though it arguably may have been a greater evil
than the acts of the defendants. The record revealed not a single
portion of the country under the control of the subversives, nor
official recognition from anyone of either the subversives or the
armed forces as belligerents. Support from foreign powers or the
Argentine populace for the subversives was virtually non-
existent.
Moreover, the defendants failed to satisfy the requirement
of choosing the least damaging evil in 'combating the supposed
greater evil of subversion. The court enumerated various other
alternatives the defendants could have pursued. They could, for
example, have arrested all presumed terrorists whose cases
presented insufficient proof for trial and held them at the dispo-
sition of the Executive Branch under the provisions of Article 23
of the Constitution. e" The defendants could have provided the
constitutionally prescribed option of exile or imprisonment
under conditions of state of siege." But according to the court,
the best course of action would have been based on respect for
the basic legal obligations expressed in the United Nations
Charter and the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the treatment of
victims of war. 00 The court concluded in a resounding condem-
nation that, all to the contrary, the defendants' response to ter-
98. Article 23 of the ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION provides:
In the event of internal disorder or foreign attack endangering the operation of
this Constitution and of the authorities created thereby, the Province or terri-
tory in which the disturbance of order exists shall be declared in a state of siege
and the constitutional guarantees shall be suspended therein. But during such
suspension the President of the Republic shall not convict or apply punishment
upon his own authority. His power shall be limited, in such a case, with respect
to persons, to arresting them or transferring them from one point of the Nation,
to another, if they do not prefer to leave Argentine territory.
See supra note 21, at 6.
99. See Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of Law in Argentina: The Politics and
Rhetoric of Vindication 15 LAW. AMER. 503 (1984); Portelli, Human Rights Problems For
A New Democracy: The Disappeared And Argentina's Current Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision, (Dec. 1984) (unpublished manuscript available at the office of
the HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL, N.Y. Law School).
100. Juicio, supra note 1, at 10, col. 4.
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rorism was to commit the armed forces to an antisubversive
struggle external to all of society, law, and ethical, cultural and
religious norms.1' 1
The Nature of War as a Defense
Considering the defendants' basic contention that their acts
were extralegal because of the exigencies of war, the court un-
dertook an extensive analysis of the issue in the light of national
and international doctrine.0 2 The court was careful to note the
general blurring of the lines concerning the implications of an
armed conflict arising in the midst of a society versus one arising
between or among separate states. The court listed the some-
times overlapping classifications of insurrection, civil war, inter-
national civil war, revolutionary war and guerilla war. The court
divided revolutionary war into five phases: infiltration, intimida-
tion, control of the population, domination of a geographic area,
development of civil war and takeover of the country.' The
court determined that the conflict occurring in Argentina was
best characterized as a revolutionary war.'04 According to an
army chief of staff, the "war" had progressed to the fourth
phase. He testified that in the impending future the terrorists
could be expected to install a revolutionary government and
make overtures for international recognition. 05 The court, how-
ever, found in contradiction that the enemy only numbered be-
tween 300 and 500 according to an internal directive issued by
the army itself. The army circular went on to describe "attempts
to open a rural front,"'06 and other purely preparatory
101. Id.
102. Id. at 13-16. See McDougal, A Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362, 364
(1971) (argues in favor of a comprehensive view of law comprised of varying degrees of
authority and control in both national and international arenas):
[There are no] neat distinctions... between the characteristics of national and
international law. [When] national law is regarded as isolated from the larger
world about it, it becomes impossible either to account for many important fac-
tors which affect decision or rationally to clarify policies for the various inter-
penetrating communities which in fact embrace the activities of man.
Id. at 377.
103. Juicio, supra note 1, at 13, col. 1 (citing treatises on war (citations omitted)).
104. Id. at 13, col. 2.
105. Id.





The defendants not only maintained that war should not be
governed by law, but in addition, they distinguished the victors
from the vanquished, finding it particularly galling that their
conduct as the "saviors of the nation" be held up to judicial
scrutiny. The court rejected as Machiavellian and unacceptable
the underlying assumption that the "princes" of this world need
only be judged by their results.10 8 The court, instead, counter-
posed the belief that legal order depends upon the ability of
courts to render judgments over all forms of human conduct." 9
The court opined that perhaps the choice of means taken by the
armed forces impelled the triumph of arms with greater speed
than would otherwise have obtained, but what in fact triumphed
was neither right nor law nor civilization, but only force."' The
defendants faced judgment not for having won the war, but
rather for the methods they employed toward this end."' The
court stated that the defendants, allegedly fighting to preserve
the values most essential to Argentine culture, tradition and way
of life, faced judgment for paradoxically depriving the nation of
the very same." 2 In the last analysis, the defendants failed the
test of Montesquieu, to preserve the state without endangering
its objectives.
As the court continued to explore the range of all possible
sources of applicable law, it found that both municipal and in-
ternational law were proper authorities for evaluating the con-
duct of the defendants during their antisubversive campaign.
107. Juicio, supra note 1, at 13, col. 2.
108. Id. at 13, col. 3 (citing N. MACHIAVELLI, EL PRINCIPE 66 (L. Navarro trans. 1895)).
For an English translation, see N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE ch. XIII (W. Marriott trans.
1952).
Intentions of men, and even more of princes, since they cannot be subjected to
the appreciation of a court should be judged by their results. All a prince does to
retain his power and the integrity of his domains will be considered honorable
and will be praised by everybody, since the populace allows itself to be led by
appearances and only judges the events.
Id.







In the case of internal disturbance, the Argentine Constitu-
tion permits the executive branch of the government to call a
state of siege."8 The court pointed out that a state of siege had
been in effect since November 6, 1974 under decree issued by
the constitutional government which preceeded the defendants'
rule."' The defendants did not seek to lift the state of siege
during any part of their tenure in office. The invocation of a
state of siege by no means precludes the powers of the state
from functioning, while at the same time, the execution of state
powers cannot be realized outside of the Constitution." 5 There-
fore, the conduct under scrutiny in this criminal action could
not be justified by the mere existence of a state of siege."' A
state of siege authorizes arrests at the disposition of the execu-
tive branch, not at the will of the armed forces, security forces or
the police. It does not authorize detention without trial, indis-
criminate damage or theft of private property, and very clearly,
a state of siege does not sanction torture, inhumane treatment
or murder."7
The history of the enactment of laws guaranteeing human
rights in Argentina dates back to the early nineteenth century.
In post-colonial Buenos Aires, a decree was issued granting "all
citizens the sacred right to the protection of their lives, honor,
liberty and property."" 8 It provided that only under the most
remote and extraordinary circumstances could the government
suspend the decree because of a threat to public tranquility and
security."' The decree imposed responsibility on the govern-
ment for actions taken during the period of extreme measures. A
suspension of the decree was permissible only as long as neces-
sity demanded. The General Assembly was to be granted notice
113. See Snyder, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. Decree 1368, Nov. 6, 1974 (B.O. Nov. 7, 1974).
115. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 1.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing J. GONZALEZ, MANUAL DE LA CONSTITUCI6N ARGENTINA 267-268 (1897)
and L. QUINTANA, V TRATADO DE LA CIENCIA DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 459 et seq.
(1956)).





of such a suspension and the justification thereto. 2 '
In more recent times, again in contemplation of an emer-
gency context, a decree issued by a civilian government declared
that all military personnel who rise up against the constituted
authorities or who participate in movements tending to defeat
them are to be shot on sight.'' This decree was challenged in
court during a period of threatened military uprisings. The Su-
preme Court held itself to be without authority to review the
law.
1 22
In the present case, the court could also have chosen the
route of lack of authority to decide, or the more common absten-
tion for prudential considerations. Instead, the court took re-
sponsibility head-on, reasoning that because the defendants pos-
sessed a wide array of law-making power at their disposal, their
choice of combating terrorism through secrecy and the imposi-
tion of a reign of terror equivalent to that of their enemy was
clearly unjustified'2 3 Reiterating that "necessity" did not dictate
recourse to the means chosen by the defendants, the court cited
a provision of the Code of Military Justice 24 applicable to both
civilians and military personnel who violate the law.
125
In their defense, the accused offered the Law of National
Defense. 26 This provides that, in case of internal disturbance,
the armed forces may be called upon to restore order or lend
necessary assistance. 127 The defendants had also attempted to
foreclose the application of international law governing the
treatment of prisoners, yet invoke national law for the adjudica-
tion of crimes allegedly committed by those detained. This in-
herent contradiction appeared in army regulations issued at the
height of the antisubversive campaign. Army Chief of Staff Ro-
berto Viola 128 approved a regulation which provided that the in-
120. Id.
121. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 1 (citing Decree 19.376, Sept. 28, 1951, later
affirmed by law 14.072 (declared a state of internal war)).
122. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 2 (citing Judgment of Amparo de Alberto Allias,
Fallos 223:206).
123. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 3.
124. Id. at 14, col. 3 (citing COD. DE Jus. MIL. art. 133).
125. Id. at art. 134.
126. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 3 (citing Law 16.970, art. 43).
127. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 3.
128. Viola was later to become a defendant in the instant criminal action and face
charges for his role as commander-in-chief of the army from 1978-79.
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dividuals who participate in subversion shall not have standing
under international public law.12 They were not to enjoy the
right to be treated as prisoners of war, but to be considered
criminals, judged and condemned as such in accordance with
national legislation. 130 This policy contradicted the defendants'
legal argument at trial on two counts. It repudiated the idea that
there was a war in effect and it endorsed the proposition that
the prisoners were to be accorded due process of law.
Beyond these contradictory and self-restrictive positions
adopted by the armed forces, still other legal instruments in ef-
fect militated against the defendants' attempts to exonerate
themselves. A regulation issued by the Army, albeit laid down
prior to the installation of the defendants' regime, recommended
moderation in the procedures used to combat terrorism.' 31 An-
other regulation set forth rules for the treatment of prisoners
which expressly prohibited any physical or psychological
torture. 132
International Law
For the court's purposes, much of international law on the
conduct of war was applicable despite defendants' views on the
status of the insurgents as mere political delinquents. 13 3 The
court cited, for example, the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the
wounded, sick and prisoners of war.3 4 According to its provi-
sions, the Geneva Convention extends to armed conflicts lacking
an international character that occur within the territory of a
subscribing country. 35 In particular, the court found the sub-
stantive prohibitions of the Geneva Convention applicable. Con-
tracting parties were expressly forbidden any attempts on the
life or bodily integrity of the wounded, sick, or prisoners of war.
Also forbidden were murder in all its forms, mutilation, cruel
129. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 4 (citing RC9-1 of the Argentine army (1977)).
130. Id. at 173.
131. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14, col. 4 (citing RC8-2, Operaciones contra fuerzas ir-
regulares (1969)).
132. Juicio, supra note 1, at 173 (citing RC16-101, Chapter IV (4.003.2)).
133. Juicio, supra note 1, at 14-16.
134. Id. at 14, col. 4 (citing J. BIDART CAMPOS, I DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 582
(1978)).
135. 6 U.S.T. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 3316.
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treatment, and torture; the taking of hostages; affronts to per-
sonal dignity, especially humiliating and degrading treatment;
sentences dictated and executions effected without prior judg-
ment by a regularly constituted court and under judicial guaran-
tees recognized as indispensable to civilized people. ' The provi-
sions applied to those who do not participate directly in the
hostilities, members of the armed forces who lay down their
arms, and the sick and wounded.
1 37
The court recounted that Argentina has also ratified many
other international treaties which have attempted to regulate
war in its more dehumanizing aspects. Argentina approved the
signing of the Pact of the Society of Nations in Versailles in
1919'11 and the United Nations Charter in 1946 among others."' e
The United Nations Charter addresses the right to self-defense
by requiring that any means necessary to repulse an attack be
immediately communicated to the Security Council. 140
The court noted that Argentina was also a subscribing
member of the Organization of American States"" whose charter
endorses much the same content of respect for human rights as
does the Charter of the United Nations.14 2 The court concluded
that international treaties should be honored so that their prin-
ciples may be framed within judicial institutions. 43
Furthermore, the court found authority in organized reli-
gion by citing one of the messages of Vatican Council II ex-
horting the peoples of the world to comply with international
treaties on the treatment of prisoners and the wounded.1
44
136. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 2.
137. Id.
138. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 1 (citing June 28, 1919, Versailles (approved by
Argentine law 11.722)).
139. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 1 (citing June 26, 1945 (approved by Argentine
law 12.838, 1946)).
140. U.N.CHARTER art. 51.
141. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 1 (citing April 31, 1948, Bogoti (approved by
Argentine Decree 328/56)).
142. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 1.
143. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 3 (citing J. DEL VECCHIo, EL FENOMENO DE LA PAZ
10, 115 (M. Castano trans. 1912)).
144. Juicio, supra note 1, at 15, col. 4 (citing Concilio Vaticano II Constituciones,
Decreto, Declaraciones, Docunentos pontificos complementarios, 79 (Madrid 1966)).
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Liability for Acts Ordered
Although the court found that the facts established that the
defendants had given orders to abduct, detain, and torture those
suspected of having ties to subversion, and the defendants had
accorded wide latitude to subordinates in determining the fate
of their prisoners,'4 5 the court still retained the legal task of ex-
plaining the theory of liability for the criminal acts themselves.
The court held that the defendants had dominion over these
acts through an organized apparatus of power.146 The defendants
were not required to have personal knowledge of exactly what
act would be carried out, precisely by whom or to whom, since
causation was determined by the fungibility of the executioners.
If one subordinate had refused to carry out an order, another
would readily step in and take his place. The commission of the
acts did not depend on exact knowledge. The role of the defend-
ants was analogized to that of a Mafia boss. The orders the boss
gives are well understood by his lieutenants and will be carried
out inexorably. This fact assured the consummation of the
crime.
4 7
Given choice of~law problems, the military code is the oper-
ative law in determining the proper body of law to apply.'" It
dictates, for example, that participation in a criminal act is gov-
erned by the laws of the Penal Code. 49 But under military law,
when a crime is committed under the orders of a superior officer,
the superior will be the only one responsible. 5 ° The inferior will
only be considered an accomplice when he has exceeded compli-
ance with the order.' 5' The court held that, in furtherance of the
policies of discipline and obedience, the commanders stood lia-
ble for issuing illegal orders, independently of their subordinates
who actually carried out the acts.'52 This policy has many adher-
145. Juicio, supra note 1, at 16, col. 3.
146. Id. at 18, col. 4.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 17, col. 3 (citing art. 108 del ordenamiento castrense and Law 23.049, art.
10).
149. Juicio, supra note 1, at 17, col. 3 (citing COD. Jus. MIL., art. 513).
150. Id. at art. 514. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.10 (Obedience to superior orders is an
affirmative defense to the charge of criminal conduct. To successfully invoke the defense,
the actor must not know the order to be unlawful.).
151. Id.
152. Juicio, supra note 1, at 17, col. 3. But see, note 8 supra, and accompanying text.
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ents among the nations of the world. The court cited equivalent
provisions in the military codes of Germany, Bolivia, Peru, Bra-
zil, Venezuela, Switzerland, Chile, Colombia, Turkey, and Italy,
where the practice dates back to Roman law.' 53
Conclusion
The acquittals and less-than-life sentences meted out to
three of the former rulers found guilty of human rights viola-
tions were vitriolicly attacked by the victims' advocacy groups
who had so actively demanded the prosecutions. Conversely, the
fact of the trial itself and, a fortiori, the convictions continued
to be the focus of passionate indignation on the part of the mili-
tary."" The opposing sides each grounded their objections on
ideological conviction, and by so doing, lessened the chances of
success for President Alfonsin's goals of depolarization of the
political climate and greater societal respect for the rule of law.
The resistence of the military and the human rights groups to
the give-and-take process of political discourse and negotiated
settlement does not enhance the prognosis.'55 Rancor over the
outcome will undoubtedly continue to divide Argentina psycho-
logically and politically for years to come. The great bloodbath
of the dirty war followed by the correspondingly lesser bloodlet-
ting of the public trial and sentencing have left all major con-
tenders, the military, the human rights groups, and the govern-
ment, with unfinished agendas and the animus to pursue them.
But in view of the complexity and volatility of the political
arena and the limited scope of this article, suffice it to say that a
153. Juicio, supra note 1, at 17, col. 4-18, col. 1.
154. Argentina's Anguish-The Gone Will Not Soon Be Forgotten, N.Y. Times, Dec.
15, 1985 at E3, col. 1.
155. On President Alfonsin's long-term goals, see Osiel supra note 17, at 158 (attrib-
utes the rise of the guerilla movements and the abuses of the counterinsurgency cam-
paign to a common origin in a lack of respect for law and lawful means of political con-
test). See also, Address by Professor Juan Corradi, Cultural Dilemmas of Democratic
Consolidation in Argentina, NYU Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies
(Feb. 12, 1987)("The military stews in its own resentment waiting for society to come to
appeal to them.").
The military's unwillingness to engage in political dialogue was made manifest to Pro-
fessor Corradi by the stony silence with which the Comando Conjunto (Chiefs of Staff)
greeted his lecture on the principles of democracy (part of a re-education seminar spon-
sored by the Alfonsin administration). According to Professor Corradi, his military audi-
ence generally understood his talk to be part of their "punishment." Id.
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strengthened Argentine judiciary and a diminished role for au-
thoritarianism seem undeniable and would constitute no mean
accomplishment for Argentina. And finally, the long-term deter-
rent effect both at home and abroad of Argentina's response to
state terrorism may ultimately prove to be its greatest value. In
the usual Latin American course of governmental succession,
victors denounce their predecessors for the abuses of the past,
but invariably stop short of demanding an accounting from them
in a court of law.156 Barring assassination, house arrest, or less
coercive means designed to remove ex-leaders permanently from
the political arena, deposed politicians tend to take up interim
residence in Miami or Madrid biding their time for a return to
power and a renewal of the cycle. 5 ' Constitutionalism may be
invoked in these comings and goings of power, but in the end,
supremacy of the law is a hollow phrase when those who wield
power are habitually beyond its pale.
In a calculated risk to its survival as a constitutional govern-
ment,'158 the Alfonsin administration empowered the nation's ju-
156. Id. at 138. "Transitions from military to civilian rule in Latin America have
almost always involved bargains protecting departing heads of state from prosecution by
their successors." Id.
157. See, e.g., POTASH, THE ARMY AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 121 (1980) (describes
Juan Per6n's direction of Peronism from exile in Madrid).
158. For an indication of the risk assumed by President Alfonsin in instigating the
prosecutions, see FBIS-LAM-85, Publisher on Camps' Threat Against Alfonsin, April
30, 1985 (Police Chief of Buenos Aires Herald is quoted as saying he would "sign the
execution order for Rail Alfonsin."). See also, Argentina May Reduce and Reorganize
its Armed Forces-Alfonsin Has Yet to Conquer the Army, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985 at
3E, col. 2.
For signs of a diminishing threat to constitutional government, see Visit by Alfonsin
Peacefully Ends Argentine Mutiny, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1987 at Al, col. 6 (attributed
the overwhelming popular denunciation of the rebellious officers as indicative of the
country's "definitive decision to live in democracy." The revolt had been triggered by
refusals to respond to court orders stemming from prosecutions for crimes committed in
the antisubversive campaign.); Army Commander in Argentina Quits In Wake of Revolt,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1987, at Al, col.2 (Many Argentines, including political opponents
of the President, described his handling of the military uprising as a "watershed in Ar-
gentina's long struggle for democracy.").
But on a less sanguine note, the patterns of alternating military and civilian rule are
deeply rooted in Argentina. For an historical perspective, see Corradi, supra note 14, at
399-400 (Of a total of 35 military uprisings in Argentina between 1900 and 1974, 23 were
unsuccessful and 12 were successful).
With a final impression of deja vu on the eve of publication, this author learned that
the variously termed "mutiny" or "rebellion" which began on April 16, 1987, described
above, may rekindle the same jurisdictional dispute ignited by the Videla controversy
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diciary to rule on the criminal culpability of its predecessors in
an attempt to thwart this predictable scenario. The concertedly
impartial trial and the court's thickly documented opinion ex-
posed a system of licensed sadism based on unchecked power
and absolute caprice. This time those responsible did not get off
unscathed. If the Videlas and Masseras yet to come should
pause and reflect on this court's judgment, choosing not to let
loose the dogs of unbridled warfare, then the ad terrorem value
of this decision shall have been sustained.
Nora Drew Renzulli
over military versus civilian forum. Depending on whether the rebel leader, Lieutenant
Colonel Aldo Rico, is charged with the crime of rebellion, punishable under the civil law,
or mutiny, a crime against discipline subject to military law, the respective federal or
military jurisdiction will follow with all of the legal and political repercussions which
each imply. See supra, notes 35-42 (for an analysis of the two forums), and 46-51 and
accompanying text (demonstrating the unwillingness of the officer corps to engage in any
internal criticism or self-purging within the military's own tribunal for what had been
done by the armed forces in the antisubversive campaign).
[Vol. IV
